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Abstract 
This paper summarizes our efforts to develop capabilities 
for policy and contract management for Semantic Web 
Services applications. KAoS services and tools allow for the 
specification, management, analyzes, disclosure and 
enforcement of policies represented in OWL. We discuss 
three current Semantic Web Services applications as 
examples of the kinds of roles that a policy management 
framework can play: as an authorization service in grid 
computing environments, as a distributed policy 
specification and enforcement capability for a semantic 
matchmaker, and as a verification tool for services 
composition and contract management. 
Introduction 
Despite rapid advances in Web Services, the demanding 
requirements of the user community continue to outstrip 
currently available technology solutions. To help close this 
gap, advocates of Semantic Web Services have begun to 
define and implement new capabilities 
(http://www.swsi.org/). These new capabilities are intended 
to more fully harness the power of Web Services through 
explicit representations of the semantics underlying Web 
resources, and the development of intelligent Web 
infrastructure capable of fully exploiting them to provide 
services that can be effectively used not only by people but 
also by software agents [12]. Semantic Web Languages 
such as OWL extend RDF to allow users to specify 
ontologies composed of taxonomies of classes and 
inference rules. Extending the initial use of the Web by 
people, agents will increasingly use the combination of 
semantic markup languages and Semantic Web Services to 
understand and autonomously manipulate Web content in 
significant ways. Agents will discover, communicate, and 
cooperate with other agents and services—and, as 
described in this paper, will rely on policy-based 
management and control mechanisms to ensure that human-
imposed constraints are respected. 
Policies and Semantic Web Services 
Policies, which constrain the behavior of system 
components, are becoming an increasingly popular 
approach to dynamic adjustability of applications in 
academia and industry (http://www.policy-workshop.org/). 
Elsewhere we have pointed out the many benefits of policy-
based approaches, including reusability, efficiency, 
extensibility, context-sensitivity, verifiability, support for 
both simple and sophisticated components, protection from 
poorly-designed, buggy, or malicious components, and 
reasoning about their behavior [2]. Policies have important 
analogues in animal societies and human cultures [6]. 
Policy-based network and distributed system management 
has been the subject of extensive research over the last 
decade (http://www-dse.doc.ic.ac.uk/Research/policies/) 
[19]. Policies are often applied to automate network 
administration tasks, such as configuration, security, 
recovery, or quality of service (QoS). In the network 
management field, policies are expressed as sets of rules 
governing choices in the behavior of the network. There are 
also ongoing standardization efforts toward common policy 
information models and frameworks. The Internet 
Engineering Task Force, for instance, has been 
investigating policies as a means for managing IP-
multiservice networks by focusing on the specification of 
protocols and object-oriented models for representing 
policies (http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/policy-
charter.html). 
The scope of policy management is increasingly going 
beyond these traditional applications in significant ways. 
New challenges for policy management include: 
• Sources and methods protection, digital rights 
management, information filtering and 
transformation, and capability-based access; 
• Active networks, agile computing, pervasive and 
mobile systems; 
• Organizational modeling, coalition formation, 
formalizing cross-organizational agreements; 
• Trust models, trust management, information 
pedigrees; 
• Effective human-machine interaction: interruption 
and notification management, presence 
management, adjustable autonomy, teamwork 
facilitation, safety; and 
• Support for humans trying to retrieve, understand, 
and analyze all policies relevant to some situation. 
Multiple approaches for policy specification have been 
proposed that range from formal policy languages that can 
be processed and interpreted easily and directly by a 
computer, to rule-based policy notation using an if-then-
else format, to the representation of policies as entries in a 
table consisting of multiple attributes. 
In the Web Services world, standards for SOAP-based 
message security1 and XML-based languages for access 
control (e.g., XACML2) have begun to appear. However 
the immaturity of the current tools along with the limited 
scope and semantics of the new languages make them less-
than-ideal candidates for the sorts of sophisticated Web-
based applications its visionaries have imagined in the next 
ten years [7]. 
The use of XML as a standard for policy expression has 
both advantages and disadvantages. The major advantage 
of using XML is its straightforward extensibility (a feature 
shared with languages such as RDF and OWL, which are 
built using XML as a foundation). The problem with mere 
XML is that its semantics are mostly implicit. Meaning is 
conveyed based on a shared understanding derived from 
human consensus. The disadvantage of implicit semantics 
is that they are rife with ambiguity, promote fragmentation 
into incompatible representation variations, and require 
extra manual work that could be eliminated by a richer 
representation. However Semantic Web-based policy 
representations, such as those described in this paper, could 
be mapped to lower level representations if required by an 
implementation by applying contextual information. 
Some initial efforts in the use of Semantic Web 
representations for basic security applications 
(authentication, access control, data integrity, encryption) 
of policy have begun to bear fruit. For example, Denker et 
al. [5] have integrated a set of ontologies (credentials, 
security mechanisms) and security extensions for Web 
Service profiles with the CMU Semantic Matchmaker [13] 
to enable security brokering between agents and services. 
Future work will allow security services to be composed 
with other services. Kagal et al. [10] are developing Rei, a 
Semantic Web language-based policy language that is 
being used as part of this and other applications. 
In another promising direction, Li, Grosof, and 
Feigenbaum [11] have developed a logic-based approach to 
distributed authorization in large-scale, open, distributed 
systems. 
KAoS Policy and Domain Management Services 
KAoS services and tools allow for the specification, 
management, conflict resolution, and enforcement of 
policies within the specific contexts established by complex 
organizational structures represented as domains [2; 3; 18]. 
While initially oriented to the dynamic and complex 
requirements of software agent applications, KAoS services 
have been extended to work equally well with both agent 





and traditional clients on a variety of general distributed 
computing platforms. 
KAoS uses ontology concepts (encoded in OWL) to build 
policies. During its bootstrap, KAoS first loads a KAoS 
Policy Ontology (KPO) defining concepts used to describe 
a generic actors’ environment and policies within this 
context (http://ontology.ihmc.us/) and then, on top of it, an 
additional ontology is loaded, extending concepts from the 
generic ontology, with notions specific to the particular 
controlled environment.  
The KAoS Policy Service distinguishes between 
authorizations (i.e., constraints that permit or forbid some 
action) and obligations (i.e., constraints that require some 
action to be performed when a state- or event-based trigger 
occurs, or else serve to waive such a requirement) [4]. 
Other policy constructs (e.g., delegation, role-based 
authorization) are built out of the basic primitives of 
domains plus these four policy types. 
The concept of an action is central to the definition of 
policies in KAoS (Fig. 1). Action is defined as an 
ontological class used to classify instances of actions that 
are intended or currently underway. If the particular action 
instance is of the type of the action class associated with 
the given policy then this policy is applicable to the current 
situation.  
 
Figure 1. Graphical interface of the OWL policy editor 
 
The use of OWL enables reasoning about the controlled 
environment, policy relations and disclosure, policy 
conflict detection, and harmonization, as well as about 
domain structure and concepts exploiting the description 
logic subsumption and instance classification algorithms. 
Conflicting policies can be identified and, if desired, 
harmonized through KAoS use of algorithms relying on the 
inference capabilities of Stanford’s Java Theorem Prover 
(JTP; http://www.ksl.stanford.edu/software/JTP/). 
A comparison of KAoS, Rei, and Ponder approaches to 
policy can be found in [17]. We highlight a few important 
features below. 
Homogeneous representation. Because all aspects of KAoS 
representation are encoded purely in OWL, any third-party 
tool or environment supporting OWL can perform 
specialized analyses of the full knowledge base completely 
independently of KAoS itself, thus easing integration with 
an increasingly sophisticated range of new OWL tools and 
language enhancements in the future. 
Maturity. Over the past few years, KAoS has been used in a 
wide range of applications and operating environments. 
Comprehensiveness. Unlike many approaches that deal 
with only simple forms of access control or authorization, 
KAoS supports both authorization and obligation policies. 
In addition, a complete infrastructure for policy 
management has been implemented including a full range 
of capabilities from sophisticated user interfaces for policy 
specification and analysis to a generic policy disclosure 
mechanism. Facilities for policy enforcement automation 
(i.e., automatic generation of code for enforcers) are under 
further development. 
Pluggability. Platform-specific and application-specific 
ontologies are easily loaded on top of the core policy 
classes. Moreover, the policy enforcement elements have 
been straightforwardly adapted to a wide range of 
computing environments. 
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss three current 
applications of KAoS to Semantic Web Services, as 
examples of the kinds of roles that a policy management 
framework can play in providing: 
• Policy management for the Grid Computing 
environments (http://www.globus.org/ogsa/); 
• Distributed policy specification and enforcement to 
a Semantic Matchmaker; 
• Verification for Semantic Web Services 
composition and contract management. 
Policy Management for Grid Computing 
Our first foray into Web Services has been the 
development of an initial OGSA-compliant1 version of 
KAoS services, allowing fine-grained policy-based 
management of registered Grid Computing services on the 
Globus platform [9]. Our goal has been to extend and 
generalize this capability so as to work with Web Services 
outside of Grid Computing environments. 
Globus provides effective resource management, 
authentication and local resource control for the grid-
computing environment, but has a need for domain and 
policy services. KAoS seemed to be a perfect complement 
to the Globus system, providing a wide range of policy 
management capabilities that rely on platform-specific 
enforcement mechanisms. By providing an interface 
between the Globus Grid and KAoS, we enable the use of 
KAoS mechanisms to manage GSI (Grid Security 
Infrastructure) enabled Grid services. GSI was the only 
component of the GT3 (Globus Toolkit) we used in the 
integration. The interface itself is a Grid service, which we 
called a KAoS Grid service. It provides Grid clients and 
services the ability to register with KAoS services, and to 
                                                          
1 OGSA - Open Grid Services Architecture, a Web Services-compatible 
standard for defining Grid Computing Services 
check weather a given action is authorized or not based on 
current policies. The basic architecture is shown in Fig 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. KAoS Grid Service Architecture 
 
Creating a KAoS Grid Service  
In order to create a KAoS Grid service, we used tools 
provided with GT3 to create a normal Grid service and 
then added to it the required KAoS framework components 
to make it KAoS aware. This framework links Grid 
services to the KAoS-implemented JAS2 services: Naming, 
Message Transport, and Directory. It also associates a 
Guard with the KAoS Grid Service, described above. 
 
Registration 
To use domain services, we needed to establish a method 
for clients and resources to register within a KAoS domain. 
The clients or resources use their credential to request to be 
registered into one or more domains. The credential is a 
standard X.509 certificate that Globus uses for 
authentication. The credential is verified using the GT GSI. 
If the certificate is valid the registration request is sent to 
KAoS for registration into the desired domains. If the 
resource uses an application specific ontology to describe 
its capabilities, it will have to be loaded into the KAoS 
ontology using a utility provided by KAoS. Inside the 
KAoS Grid service, the registration is handled through the 
associated Guard. This allows KAoS to distribute all 
applicable policies to the appropriate Guard. 
 
Expressing Policies 
The basic components of any authorization policy are the 
actor(s), action and target(s). A sample policy would read 
as follows:  
It is permitted for actor(s) X to perform action(s) 
Y on target(s) Z.  
Actors requesting to execute an action are mapped to 
various actor classes and instances in the KAoS Policy 
Ontology (KPO). In this case, actors consist of various 
software clients and the groups they belong to. Registration 
adds each client to the existing KAoS knowledge base 
stored within JTP, offline or at runtime, enabling policies 
to be written about the client or its domain. 
                                                          
2 JAS – Java Agent Services (http://sourceforge.net/projects/jas/) 
The actions can be represented at different levels of 
generality. A policy defined on a more general action might 
permit or forbid overall access to a service, which is useful 
for simple services or services that do not provide varying 
levels of access. For example, a policy defining overall 
permissions for a chat service might make use of generic 
communication concepts in the existing KPO as in the 
following: 
It is forbidden for Client X to perform a 
communication action if the action has a 
destination of Chat Service Y.  
This policy would be used to prevent Client X from using 
Chat Service Y. KAoS already understands the concepts of 
“forbidden”, “communication action” and “has 
destination.” KAoS will also understand “Client X” and 
“Chat Service Y” once each entity registers. 
More complex services may require new concepts in the 
ontologies that map to specific actions on a Grid Service. 
For example, Reliable File Transfer Service has a variety of 
methods that may not map to an existing ontology. To 
provide fine-grained control of this service, the KAoS 
ontology can be extended for the specific domain space and 
loaded into KAoS using KPAT (KAoS Policy 
Administration Tool), a graphical user interface for 
interacting with KAoS (see Fig. 1 for example of KPAT 
window). We are currently working on a tool to 
automatically generate OWL ontology for a given WSDL1 
specification of the OGSI-Compliant Grid Service.  
Targets can be clients, services, or domain specific entities, 
such as different computing resources. The first two cases 
are added to the KAoS ontology upon their registration 
within KAoS Directory Service, but the last case, requires 
extensions to the ontology, either before loading into KAoS 
or using graphical interface in KPAT. 
Policies may be written to restrict a client’s use of a 
resource, or to restrict the set of access rights delegated to 
the KAoS Grid service.  
 
Checking Authorization 
Since the KAoS Grid Service has full control of access to a 
given resource based on the rights permitted by 
participating resources, it serves as the policy enforcer, 
using Globus local enforcement mechanisms. The KAoS 
Grid service coordinates with the KAoS Guard to 
determine authorization for a requested action. Once 
registered, clients will have access to the Grid service 
based on the policies in KAoS. As policies are added into 
KAoS through KPAT, they are automatically converted to 
OWL for use in reasoning, and to a simple and efficient 
representation in the Guard associated with the KAoS Grid 
service for enforcement purposes. When a client requests a 
service, the KAoS Grid service will check if the requested 
action is authorized based on current policies by querying 
the Guard. If the Guard allows the requested action, KAoS 
Grid service initializes a GIS restricted proxy certificate by 
putting the permissions needed to execute the action in its 
                                                          
1 WSDL - Web Services Description Language 
(http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl) 
own end GIS entity certificate. This certificate is the one 
provided by the resource at registration and maps to the 
local control mechanism. The KAoS Grid Service also sets 
the proxy lifetime and signs it. The restricted proxy 
certificate is returned to the client. The client then uses this 
proxy certificate to access the given grid service. 
When a service receives a request it checks the submitted 
certificate against the local GIS control mechanism. 
Services can also check permissions by querying the KAoS 
Grid service directly. The service checks to ensure that 
action requested is covered by the intersection of the rights 
given to the KAoS service and the rights embedded in the 
certificate by the KAoS service. This allows the local 
resource owner to write policies restricting the rights it 
allows KAoS to delegate. 
A current limitation of our implementation is that there is 
no mechanism for proxy certificate revocation. Globus 
relies on short lifetimes to limit proxy credentials. An 
updated policy in KAoS would not take effect until the 
current proxy credential expired forcing the user to return 
to KAoS for an update. 
Policy Management for Semantic Matchmaking 
Within the CoSAR-TS (Coalition Search and Rescue Task 
Support; Principal Investigator: Austin Tate) project 
(http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/cosar-ts/) we are testing 
the integration of KAoS and AIAI’s I-X technology with 
Semantic Web Services. Military search and rescue 
operations by nature require the kind of rapid dynamic 
composition of available policy-constrained resources for a 
task that make it a good use case for Semantic Web 
technologies. Other participants in the application include 




I-X Process Panels (http://i-x.info; [15; 16]) can provide 
task support by reasoning about and exchanging with other 
agents and services any combination of Issues, Activities, 
Constraints and Annotations (in the <I-N-C-A> ontology). 
I-X can therefore provide collaborative task support and 
exchange of structured messages related to plans, activity 
and the results of such activity. These types of information 
can be exchanged with other tools via OWL, RDF or other 
languages. The system includes an AI planner that can 
compose a suitable plan for the given tasks when provided 
with a library of standard operating procedures or 
processes, and knowledge of other agents or services that it 
may use.  
Fig. 3 shows an I-X Process Panel (I-P2) and associated I-X 
Tools. I-X can make use of multiple communications 
methods ranging from simple XML instant messaging (e.g. 
Jabber) to sophisticated policy constrained agent 
communications environments (e.g. CoABS Grid, KAoS). 
The I-Space tool maintains agent relationships. The 
relationships can be obtained from agent services such as 
KAoS if that is used to describe agents, domains and 
policies. Communications methods and new contacts can 
be added or changed dynamically while an I-X system is 
running. I-X Process Panels can also link to semantic web 
information and web services, and can be integrated via “I-
Q” adaptors [14] to appear in a natural way during 
planning and in plan execution support. 
 
Figure 3. I-X Process Panel for a Coalition Search and 
Rescue Task 
 
Constraints sent to I-X immediately change the model state 
that is visualized in all views and used throughout the 
system. These changes can trigger preconditions on 
activities and affect the action options presented in the 
selection menus. So, for example, web services availability 
information, agent presence or status, and agent or people 
GPS positions can be sent to I-X as world state constraint 
messages and appear immediately. This allows for high 
levels of dynamic workflow support. 
I-X work to date has concentrated on dynamically 
determined workflows at execution time – using knowledge 
of services and other agent availability, etc. However, there 
is also a process editor for creating process models (I-DE) 
to populate the domain model and an AI planner (I-Plan) 
which allows for hierarchical plan creation, precondition 
achievement, consistent binding of multiple variables, 
temporal constraint checking, and so forth. 
 
CoSAR-TS Scenario 
The scenario begins with an event that reports a downed 
airman between the coastlines of four fictional nations 
bordering the Red Sea: Agadez, Binni and Gao (to the 
West), and Arabello (to the East). In this initial scenario it 
is assumed that excellent location knowledge is available, 
and that there are no local threats to counter or avoid in the 
rescue. The airman reports his own injuries via his suit 
sensors in this initial scenario. 
Next is an investigation of the facilities available to rescue 
the airman. There will be three possibilities: a US ship-
borne helicopter; a Gaoan helicopter from a land base in 
Binni; or a patrol boat from off the Arabello coastline. 
Finally, there is a process to establish available medical 
facilities for the specialized injury reported using the 
information provided about the countries in the region. A 
hospital in Arabello is best placed to provide the facilities, 
due to the fact that it has the necessary treatment facilities. 
However, there is a coalition policy that no Gaoan 
helicopters may be used by coalition members to transport 
injured airmen. 
 
CoSAR-TS Scenario Knowledge and Ontologies 
Several OWL ontologies define the SAR domain and the 
services that are available. Knowledge of medical facilities 
is obtained from a medical OWL ontology stored in the 
BBN SONAT database. This has been extended to include 
data on the fictional countries in the Binni scenario: 
Agadez, Arabello, Binni and Gao. The medical ontology 
includes several instances of Hospital and other medical 
facilities, and associated information provides the latitude 
and longitude of hospital locations. Services that may be 
invoked are defined in OWL-S. For example, we defined 
the GaoMarineHelicopter service profile, which has the 
associated atomic process PickUpDownedPilot. Gao 
provides this profile, and has an input defined by the 
(constrained) parameter description PickUpLocation which 
refers to the property pickUpLocation_In restricted to 
Location. The HospitalLocation and CountryOfHospital 
are further inputs to the service profile, and these have 
similar definitions. These resources provide the domain 
knowledge and service capabilities that are required to plan 
the SAR mission. 
 
Figure 4. CoSAR-TS architecture. 
 
CoSAR-TS Components 
Four coalition agents are used, representing the roles and 
functions of the Coalition SAR coordinator, US SAR 
officer, hospital information provider, and SAR resource 
provider. The Coalition SAR coordinator has an I-X 
process panel, which can be used to follow a standard 






process in I-X, which, at the top-level, contains the four 
activities: select hospital; select SAR resource; notify SAR 
resource; notify hospital; which are executed sequentially. 
The select hospital activity is broken down further into 
three steps, one of which is lookup hospital—an action that 
can be carried out by querying the SONAT database of 
OWL-encoded facts (as described above). The 
decomposition of the select SAR resource activity includes 
lookup SAR resource, an activity that can be carried out by 
querying the CMU Semantic Matchmaker [13] for a service 
with a matching profile (i.e. one of the rescue services 
encoded in OWL-S such as GaoMarineHelicopter). 
Notifications are done using Sadeh's Notification Agent1, 
which relies upon profiles defined using concepts from the 
notification ontology to forward messages. 
 
CoSAR-TS Policy Services Description 
While annotation of the Semantic Matchmaker service 
profiles allows registered service providers to describe 
required security profiles [5], it does not allow owners of 
infrastructure resources (e.g., computers, networks), client 
organizations (coalition organizations, national interest 
groups), or individuals to specify or enforce policy from 
their unique perspectives. For example, the policy that 
coalition members cannot use Gaoan transports is not 
something that can be anticipated and specified within the 
Matchmaker service profile. Neither would Matchmaker 
service profile annotations be an adequate implementation 
for a US policy obligating encryption, prioritizing the 
allocation of network bandwidth, or requiring the logging 
of certain sorts of messages. 
Moreover, the semantics of these policies cannot currently 
be expressed in terms of the current OWL-S specification 
of conditional constraints. Even if they were expressible, 
organizations and individuals may prefer to keep policy 
stores, reasoners, and enforcement capabilities within their 
private enclaves. This may be motivated by both the desire 
to maintain secure control over sensitive components as 
well as to keep other coalition members from becoming 
aware of private policies. For example, coalition members 
may not want Gao to be aware that the offer of their 
helicopters to rescue the downed airman will be 
automatically filtered out by policy. 
Within the current CoSAR-TS implementation, KAoS is 
used to define, represent, analyze, query, and deconflict 
policies about access to Semantic Matchmaker information. 
Additionally, we have defined enforcers that intercept 
SOAP messages from the Matchmaker and filter results 
consistent with coalition policies, specifically those that 
prevent the use of Gaoan resources in the demo situation. 
We are extending the SOAP-enabled enforcer to 
understand arbitrary Web Semantic Service invocations so 
it can apply appropriate authorization policies to them. 
Additionally, we plan to equip it with a mechanism to 
perform obligation policies, which will be in the form of 
other Web Service invocations. For instance it can be 
                                                          
1 http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~sadeh/ 
imagined that some policy may require consultation or 
registration of performed transactions in some logging 
service available as a Web Service audit entity. 
Verification for Semantic Web Services Composition 
Automatic composition of feasible workflows from 
available Semantic Web Services is an ongoing research 
topic. An obvious solution argued in this paper, as also 
proposed in [20], is the application of existing solutions: 
the input and output formats can be straightforwardly 
mapped to the emerging standard of the Semantic Web 
Services Process Model (http://www.owl.org/services/owl-
s/1.0/). To this end, we are extending our implementations 
of I-X and KAoS. 
 
I-K-C Tool 
In the context of CoSAR-TS, we have already integrated 
KAoS and I-X to allow I-X to obtain information about the 
relations about actors (human and software) such as peers, 
subordinates and superiors and others represented in 
domains and stored in the KAoS Directory Services. I-X is 
also already able to use the KAoS policy disclosure 
interface to learn about the impact of policies on its 
planned actions. These represent first steps toward mutual 
understanding of workflow specifications. 
 
Figure 5. Cooperation between I-X and KAoS in the 
Process of Semantic Workflow Composition 
 
I-K-C is a name of the tool, integrating I-X and KAoS, 
enabling composition of Semantic Web Services into 
workflow taking into account policies constraining usage of 
these services and their composition. At first, this tool is 
going to build a workflow from the client perspective 
taking into account only its policies, constraining usage of 
different services and their composition, when building the 
workflow. In order to realize the architecture in Fig. 52, the 
                                                          
2 http://ontology.ihmc.us/SemanticServices/I-K-C/I-K-C-Ontologies.htm 
provides links to the actual ontology files in OWL 
I-X Process editor and I-Plan planning elements are being 
extended to allow the creation of composed workflows in 
advance of execution. This will allow for the import of 
services described in OWL-S to be used within the planner, 
augmenting any predefined processes in the process library. 
KAoS verifies constructed partial plans for policy 
compliance. In order to achieve that a mapping from the 
KAoS ontology of action1 to the OWL-S process ontology 
was developed. Additional ontologies enabling 
modification of partial plans with policy-related markup to 
describe the results of policy checks for composed 
workflows is also required. We are using <I-N-C-A> so 
that the results can be expressed either as specific 
constraints that must be added into the ‘plan,’ as specific 
issues to address, or possibly activities to be added. 
Additional information that cannot be conveyed as one of 
these three types can be conveyed as <I-N-C-A> 
annotations. The final plan in OWL-S ontology can be 
exported for use in other enactment systems or can be 
utilized to guide the dynamic reactive execution of those 
plans in I-P2 or other tools. 
An open research issue, common to others now exploring 
the use of HTN planning approaches to web services 
composition [20], is how far to go with plan time 
composition and how much to leave unselected to dynamic 
enactment support which can account for available 
services, discovery of services, and so forth. 
During plan execution, the KAoS Policy Service can 
independently ensure that interactions between services 
comply with policies constraining their usage. The policies 
controlling both authorization and obligation of clients and 
servers are stored in KAoS and checked by interested 
parties2. It is possible to automatically enforce these 
policies, both authorizations and obligations, by integration 
of Semantic Web Services with the KAoS enforcer, as a 
generalization of what is being done in the CoSAR-TS 
application. The existing approaches to securing Semantic 
Web Services are limited to either marking Service 
advertisement with requirements for authentication and 
communication and enforcing compliance with these 
requirements [5] or by attaching conditions to inputs, 
outputs and effects of services. KAoS is able to reason 
about the entire action performed by the services and soon 
will be able to understand workflows defined by I-X 
technologies. Additionally we plan to use KAoS to 
generate obligations created during use of the services, 
which can be passed as constraints back to I-X. 
 
Semantic Firewall 
A necessary requirement for the support of complex, 
dynamic groups of service providers in a business context 
is the notion of a contract. While KAoS policies represent 
constraints on behavior involuntarily imposed on software 
entities, contracts represent voluntary agreements that 
                                                          
1 http://ontology.ihmc.us/Action.owl 
2  Of course these parties would have to be authorized to have access to 
the policies in question. 
mutually bind the participants to various authorizations, 
obligations, and modes of interaction. As an example of the 
application of contracts to Semantic Web Services, Grosof 
and Poon [8] have developed SweetDeal, a rule-based 
approach to automating “law in the small.” SweetDeal 
represents business contracts to allow software agents to 
create, evaluate, negotiate, and execute contracts among 
themselves for the performance of Semantic Web Services. 
Within KAoS, we plan to extend the existing representation 
of policy sets to include rules and other constructs 
necessary to enable the creation and execution of contracts. 
As part of contract creation, KAoS already has capabilities 
for detecting policy conflicts and suggesting harmonization 
[3]. These are being extended and combined with new 
facilities for negotiation, and extensions to existing 
capabilities for enforcement. 
Figure 6. KAoS Policy Service as Negotiator, Holder and 
Enforcer of Contracts Policies between Web Services 
 
Contracts can be stored either within instances of KAoS (or 
perhaps some other interoperable policy service) associated 
with each Web Service or else, when stakeholders prefer, 
as independent KAoS instances representing neutral third 
parties (Fig. 6). We have begun to explore these new issues 
in policy and contract management and execution in the 
context of a collaboration with University of Southampton, 
IT Innovation, and SRI International to develop a Semantic 
Firewall [1]3. The tool will take as an input a desired client 
workflow and starts negotiation with the policy services 
associated with semantic service provider to be used in the 
proposed workflow. In effect, the initial workflow can be 
modified and amended with the agreed policy contract. 
This contract will be then enforced by the system. 
 
Tools Integration 
An Integration of these two complementary tools, I-K-C 
and Semantic Firewall, is envisioned for the next phase. 
The resulting combination can use I-K-C to produced 
initial workflow and then a policy contract can be 
negotiated and enforced by the Semantic Firewall. Further 
development may combine these tools even closer by 




                                                          
3 See http://ontology.ihmc.us/SemanticServices/S-F/Example/index.html 
for an example scenario with policies encoded using KAoS Policy syntax. 
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